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AN ECONOMIC EVALUATION OF A CROP INSURANCE 
PROGRAMME FOR SMALL-SCALE COMMERCIAL 






Hail insurance is provided by the private sector in South Africa but crop insurance (drought 
insurance) programmes, after a promising start, failed to attract customers. A crop insurance 
programme (drought) for small-scale commercial farmers, who are not yet paying tax, has been 
recommended to government. The purpose in this research is to study the economic viability of 
such a programme drawing on the US experience. The US programme is well developed but 
heavily subsidised. During 1998 US growers paid $900 million in premiums while during 1995-
98 the US government spent $1.2 billion per year on subsidies. An area insurance plan (farmers 
are insured as a group) is shown to be more appropriate for small farmers growing dryland field 
crops such as maize because risk is systemic (drought related) while adverse selection, moral 
hazard etc are overcome. Individual crop insurance will not be viable due to the cost of farm 
visits (verification of claims) and the non-availability of information. As a large part of the cost 
to government goes to administration of crop insurance it is recommended that an Income 
Equalisation Deposit (IED) scheme for small growers receive serious consideration with the 
government making a contribution as for example in Canada.  
 
‘N EKONOMIESE EVALUASIE VAN ‘N OESVERSEKERINGSKEMA VIR 
KLEINSKAALSE KOMMERSIËLE BOERE IN SUID AFRIKA  
 
Boere in Suid Afrika kan verseker teen hael maar oesversekering teen droogte het gefaal. ‘n 
Aanbeveling is aan die staat gemaak om gesubsidieerde oesversekering (droogte) aan kleinskaalse 
kommersiële boere wat nog nie belasting betaal nie beskikbaar te stel. Die doel met hierdie studie 
is om die ekonomiese lewensvatbaarheid van so ‘n studie te ondersoek aan die hand van 
ondervinding in die VSA. Die program in die VSA word swaar gesubsidieer. Gedurende 1998 
het boere in die VSA $900 miljoen aan oesversekeringspremies betaal terwyl die Staat se bydrae 
gedurende 1995-98 $1.2 biljoen per jaar beloop het. ‘n Area-versekeringskema (boere word as ‘n 
groep verseker) is beter as individuele versekering vir kleinboere wat droëland gewasse verbou 
soos mielies, omdat risiko sistemies (droogte bepalend) is terwyl dit ook die probleme wat 
normaalweg met oesversekering verband hou, oplos. Individuele oesversekering is nie haalbaar 
vir kleinboere nie weens die koste van plaasbesoeke (om eise te verifieer) en omdat inligting nie 
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voldoende beskikbaar is nie. Omdat ‘n groot deel van die koste van so ‘n skema deur die Staat 
gedra sal moet word, word aanbeveel dat ‘n Inkomste Gelykstellingsdeposito (IGD) skema 
ernstig oorweeg word, waar die Staat ‘n bydrae maak, soos in Kanada. 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
T h e  p u r p o s e  o f  t h i s  r e s e a r c h  i s  t o  s t udy the economic feasibility of a crop 
insurance programme for small-scale commercial farmers who are not yet paying 
tax. The South African Government is currently considering crop insurance of 
small-scale farmers as a risk management strategy. A Bi-National Committee 
(BNC) has been established between South Africa and the USA regarding crop 
insurance and risk management education in South Africa. This research is part 
of a larger study on risk management as the economic feasibility of an Income 
Equalisation Deposit (IED) scheme for tax paying farmers is also being 
investigated as a risk management tool. 
 
Uncertainty of crop yield is one of the most basic risks farmers’ face. A great 
majority of farmers in most countries are unable to withstand such risks due to 
insufficient resources. The principal characteristic distinguishing agriculture from 
other industries is its dependence on nature. By offering protection to farmers 
against the physical failure of crops due to weather and other unavoidable 
natural hazards, crop insurance advances the process of stabilising the 
agricultural industry (Ray, 1981). 
 
On a continuum of common risks, collective crop loss risk lies halfway between 
the polar extremes of purely diversifiable, independent risks (auto, life, fire) and 
purely systemic, correlated risks (prices and rates) (Miranda & Glauber, 1997). 
This defining characteristic of crop loss risk, provides a huge challenge to the 
crop insurance industry in designing and implementing feasible crop insurance 
schemes. 
 
Failure of crop insurance markets has been primarily attributed to the problems 
of asymmetric information and systemic risk, both of which are found on such a 
large scale only in agriculture. Systemic risk undermines insurer attempts to 
provide affordable insurance to individual farmers as the cost of holding the 
reserves necessary to cope with widespread natural disaster is prohibitive. 
Asymmetric information raises insurer’s costs to the extent that the premiums 
necessary to cover these costs become unaffordable to individual farmers. 
 
There are new developments in the USA crop insurance programme while this 
topic has received considerable attention in the literature in recent years. Given 




crop insurance industry, the challenge in this study is whether this programme 
can be adapted to small-scale farmers in South Africa. A major problem with crop 
insurance in the USA has been the high cost of administration which would be 
larger per hectare of land for small scale farmers. Special attention will thus be 
given in this study to the economic feasibility of an area insurance programme as 
a way to reduce costs associated with administration, asymmetric information 
and systemic risk. The writer has benefited from discussions with Dr I van 
Rooyen, Sentraoes, Ficksburg who has experience in the provision of hail 
insurance to small scale wheat farmers and Mr C Oliver of Grocane, Durban 
which provides fire insurance to small scale cane farmers.  
 
2.  HISTORY OF PAST EXPERIENCE WITH CROP INSURANCE IN THE 
USA AND SOUTH AFRICA 
 
The USA has best developed crop insurance programme in the world while 
South Africa’s experience with crop insurance has been limited. 
 
2.1  South African experience with crop insurance 
 
2.1.1 Historical  perspective 
 
South Africa’s one attempt to broaden access to drought-inclusive crop insurance 
was not particularly successful. A scheme was launched in 1979 whereby the SA 
Government subsidised 25% of the crop insurance premia for special 
comprehensive policies offered by Sentraoes and CUAS (previously AA Mutual 
Agricultural Services). The sum insured was based on 60% of the average yield 
and premia were set on a farm by farm basis after on-site evaluation. In the 1980's 
the SA crop insurance initiative was hailed in Washington as one of the best 
examples of a scheme largely managed by private enterprise as the Federal Crop 
Insurance Corporation (FCIC) Programme at that time was largely managed by 
government. The SA scheme failed after ten years. 
 
2.1.2  Factors influencing crop insurance participation (a South African study) 
 
The Task Team on Drought and other Agricultural Disasters (1997) attributed the 
reasons for the failure of the South Africa scheme to the low participation rate, 
which in turn seems to have been a function of an insufficiently developed 
pricing structure, an insufficient subsidy and the disincentive posed by the 
existence of other avenues for receiving ad hoc drought assistance from the 
Department of Agriculture in the form of free disaster relief. 
 




South African maize farmers insure or not insure their crops. Results from a 
sample of 82 maize farmers indicated that those producers who insured their 
crops comprehensively had a low percentage of gross farm income from 
livestock, a relatively unfavourable liquidity position, substantial long-term debt, 
and a low gross farm income to assets ratio. These farmers also had a high-risk 
index, tend to be older and more experienced. A risk index that takes cognisance 
of individual farmer yield, crop specialisation or diversification was used. 
 
As very little research has been undertaken on crop insurance in South Africa, the 
discriminant function estimated by Jarvie and Nieuwoudt (1989) is shown below: 
 





XX  = variables significant at 1% level 
DISC = 1.0 if insured, zero otherwise, 
LS  = % income from livestock, 
LIQ  =  A principal component was extracted from three variables namely gross 
farm income, credit reserve, and the ratio of assets to liabilities, 
DEBT = Long term debt, 
GA  = Ratio between gross farm income and assets,  
RISK  =  Coefficient of variation of crop yields weighted by relative area under a 
crop 
EXP  = A principal component of years farming and age. 
 
All the variables were significant at the 1% level. As the function is in 
standardised form the importance of a variable is indicated by the magnitude of 
its discriminant function coefficient. For instance the livestock index was the most 
important variable (it had the highest standardised coefficient) in explaining the 
separation between the two groups (insured versus non-insured). It was 
concluded that crop insurers should direct their efforts at cropping areas known 
to be specialised in their enterprise portfolio and that have relatively small herds 
of livestock, variable yields and fair amount of debt. 
 
In the South African maize belt, farmers have little scope to diversify as all crops 
are affected by similar weather conditions. It is thus not surprising that the 
livestock variable was important as this is probably the only enterprise that could 
provide some stability to crop farming under the conditions where most of the 
income is derived from a single crop. Research conducted in the USA 




in areas where one crop is predominant, for instance wheat in Kansas and 
Montana. The implication is that the demand for insurance is high in South 
Africa where most income is from a single crop as in the maize, wheat and sugar 
cane areas. 
 
2.1.3  Lessons from the SA experience 
 
The programme became not viable after the SA Government started to withdraw 
premium subsidies from crop insurance. Further, massive drought assistance 
given to farmers reduced the incentive to insure. Inclusion of a livestock 
enterprise may be a good risk management strategy. 
 
2.2  Experience with the USA Federal Crop Insurance Programme. 
 
2.2.1 Historical  perspective 
 
The Federal Crop Insurance Act was signed into law in the United States in 1980. 
Policy makers envisioned a crop insurance programme that would ultimately 
operate on a near actuarially sound base with limited government financial 
assistance. The major insurance product made available to farmers under this Act 
was named Multiple Peril Crop Insurance (MPCI) and was marketed to 
individual farmers by private insurance companies. The Act authorised the 
Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) to subsidise producer premium 
payments and to reimburse participating private insurance companies for their 
administrative expenditures and part of their underwriting losses. MCPI covers 
all natural risks, including unavoidable losses from drought, excessive rain and 
storm damage. Producers can purchase individualised coverage for either 50%, 
65% or 75% of normal yield and one of three different price election levels. 
Normal yields are based on Actual Production Histories (APH).  
 
Price election levels are determined form FCIC forecasts of expected prices. 
Should the producer’s yield fall below the elected coverage level, he or she 
receives an indemnity equal to the yield shortfall times the elected price level. 
Insurance product choices have expanded from individual- farm yield insurance 
to include area-yield insurance and a variety of crop revenue insurance products. 
The programme has expanded in recent years and about two-thirds of planted 
acreage of corn, soybeans, and wheat was covered by crop insurance in 1998 
(Dismukes, 1999). 
 
MPCI has been plagued by low participation rates, huge federal outlays and high 
loss ratios incurred by insurers (Smith & Baquet, 1996). Acreage insurance during 




more diversified farming areas. For instance in North Dakota and Montana 40% 
to 50% of wheat acreage (predominant crop) was insured but in the diversified 
corn belt only 4% of the wheat acreage was insured in Illinois (Nieuwoudt et al, 
1985). 
 
Between 1980 and 1988, the loss ratio experience by private insurers (indemnities 
paid divided by premiums collected) averaged 2.05, well in excess of the 
approximate 0.95 level generally regarded as necessary for break-even insurance 
operations. During 1998 US growers paid $900 million in crop insurance 
premiums while during 1995-98 the US government spent $1.2 billion per year on 
premium subsidies, administration and operating subsidies, and net 
underwriting losses (Dismukes, 1999).  The US Treasury’s contribution to the 
Programme is thus significant and greater than the farmers’ contribution while 
farmers receive twice as much in indemnities as they pay in premiums. 
Mandatory crop insurance was required after 1994 in order to qualify for other 
programme benefits but this was terminated in 1996 (Dismukes, 2000). 
 
Miranda (1991) attributes the failure of the Federal crop insurance programme to 
operate on an actuarially sound basis to the problems inherent in trying to tailor 
coverage to individual yield-loss experience, these include adverse selection, 
moral hazard and high administrative costs. Halcrow (1949), cited by Miranda 
(1991), concluded that individual-yield crop insurance “will work in a 
satisfactory manner only under a system of conditions so exacting in their 
specification that they will be found to a rather limited extent in American 
Agriculture”.  
 
2.2.2  Delivery of federal crop insurance in the USA 
 
USDA’s Risk Management agency (RMA) is charged with the administration of 
crop insurance programs for the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC). The 
FCIC regulates and promotes insurance programme coverage (Dismukes, 1999). 
This includes the setting of premium rates, ensuring contract compliance and 
providing premium and operating subsidies. Crop insurance policies are sold, 
serviced and underwritten by private insurance companies. Insurance companies 
also develop new insurance products that are approved for subsidies and 
reinsurance by FCIC and offer private coverages (without subsidisation) that 
supplement federal crop insurance. Companies compete for crop insurance 
business through insurance agents who sell and service the policies. Agents may 
be independent or contracted to a single company. Private companies share their 
underwriting risk with the FCIC by designating their crop insurance policies to 
risk-sharing categories, called reinsurance funds. Each fund allows for different 




government fund. Companies that qualify to deliver crop insurance annually 
submit plans of operation for approval by the FCIC. This provides information on 
the ability of the company to pay potential underwriting losses and on the 
allocation of the company’s crop insurance business to the various risk sharing 
categories or reinsurance funds. In addition to underwriting terms, companies 
are paid a subsidy by FCIC for administrative, operating and loss adjustment 
costs. The reinsurance terms are specified in the Standard Reinsurance 
Agreement (SRA) which applies to all companies delivering FCIC-reinsured 
policies (Dismukes, 1999). 
 
Insurance product choices have expanded from simple individual yield crop 
insurance called Actual Production History Multiple Peril Crop Insurance to 
include area yield insurance and various crop revenue insurance products 
(Adjusted Gross Revenue and Group Risk Income Protection were added in 
1999). Revenue insurance is covering a substantial portion of crops in some areas 
(Dismukes, 1999). 
 
CAT (short for catastrophic) is a minimum level of insurance provided to 
producers at low cost. During 1999 CAT coverage at 50% of the producer’s 
expected yield and 55% of expected price cost $60 per crop (the processing fee). 
While the cost is low only about 28% of expected revenue is insured and CAT 
coverage levels have declined in recent years (Dismukes, 2000). 
 
The primary area-yield insurance product, The Group Risk Plan, is gaining 
popularity after its implementation in 1994 (Harwood et al, 1999). 
 
2.2.3  Lessons from the USA experience 
 
There are several lessons from the US programme: 
 
(a)  Governments should not get involved in the management of the 
programme, as the programme will then not be driven by business 
principles. When the FCIC programme was administrated by the US 
government during the period up to the early eighties, farmers in the high 
risk areas (cotton in Texas) received indemnities in excess of premiums for 
10 out of 11 consecutive years implying that risk taking is subsidised while 
the opposite happened in the corn belt. The very nature of the information 
problem is that premiums of the more risky producers are subsidised at 
the cost of the least risky, creating a price distortion.  
 
(b)  Adverse selection arising from the information problem can be tackled 




individual farmers or compulsory insurance. Compulsory insurance will 
make those who would not willingly buy insurance worse off. The USA 
has promoted insurance through high subsidies, providing farmers better 
insurance products and obtaining better information on risk faced by 
farmers. A subsidy makes insurance attractive to risk adverse farmers who 
would have dropped out because of adverse selection. There is no welfare 
benefit if a risk neutral person insures as risk does not distort the prices he 
perceives. A problem is that subsidies create distortions of their own if 
subsidised premiums are lower than expected indemnities.  
 
(c)  A major problem with the MPCI was lack of acceptable participation and 
the relatively large loss ratios since 1980. Low participation may impact on 
risk spreading. A bigger problem of low participation is, however, that if 
few farms are insured that in the event of drought the government will 
bend to political pressure and offer disaster assistance. This in turn will 
remove all the incentives that farmers have to insure. Crop insurance has 
expanded in recent years, almost tripling in size since the early 1990's 
while providing farmers with greater choices. Whereas disaster payments 
discouraged participation in crop insurance in the early eighties, farmers 
who insure their crops now receive more disaster payments, reversing 
incentives to insure. Increased participation in crop insurance comes at a 
high cost to the US tax payer as the USA Government is paying more than 
50% of the total cost of the programme. Given the magnitude of the US 
Government’s contribution it is questionable whether the programme is 
cost effective.  
 
3.  PROBLEMS INHERENT IN CROP INSURANCE 
 
Studies in recent years have concluded that market failure in crop insurance 
primarily results from asymmetric information problems, particularly adverse 
selection and moral hazard. The asymmetric information problem stems from the 
fact that the cost of obtaining accurate loss-risk information and the cost of 
monitoring farmer behaviour are prohibitively high (Miranda & Glauber, 1997). 
Recent scholars claim that systemic risk and not asymmetric information poses 
the more serious obstacle to the emergence of an independent private crop 
insurance industry. These problems are briefly evaluated. 
 
3.1  Asymmetric information 
 
(a)  Adverse selection 
 




distribution of their own yields and are thus better able to assess the actuarial 
fairness of their premiums than the insurer, who lacks access to reliable 
individual yield data and other relevant information. Producers who recognise 
that their expected indemnities exceed their premiums are more likely to 
purchase coverage than those whose premiums are actuarially high. As a result, 
the insurers expected indemnity outlays exceed total premium income, and, in 
the long run, the insurance operation loses money. Efforts by the insurer to avoid 
these losses by raising premiums only result in a smaller and more adversely 
selected pool of participants (Miranda, 1991). 
 
(b)  Moral hazard 
 
Moral hazard results from asymmetric information. It occurs when, without the 
knowledge of the insurer, the insured changes behaviour after purchasing 
insurance in a manner that increases the probability of receiving an indemnity 
payment (Miranda & Glauber, 1997). Coble et al (1997) note that moral hazard has 
a significant effect on expected MPCI indemnities in most poor production years 
but not in years when growing conditions are favourable. Coble et al (1997) 
conclude that current monitoring practices do not effectively control moral 
hazard. 
 
(c)  High administration costs 
 
Record keeping and other manpower requirements needed to verify individual 
production histories and to adjust individual yield-loss claims raise insurer 
expenditures and impose high transactions costs (Miranda, 1991). 
 
(d)  Elasticity of demand for crop insurance 
 
Nieuwoudt & Bullock (1986:659) estimated the elasticity of demand for crop 
insurance in the USA at -0.43 implying that the area insured is not responsive to 
the premium rate or the level of subsidies. The implication is that a 1% subsidy 
on premiums is estimated to increase acreage insured by 0.43%. This low price 
elasticity of demand implies that significant subsidies are required to stimulate 
the demand for crop insurance. Goodwin (1993) estimated the demand for crop 
insurance in the USA at -0.32 for relative insured acres and -0.73 for liability per 
planted acre. Both studies indicate that the demand for crop insurance is inelastic. 
The Nieuwoudt & Bullock (1986) study indicated that disaster payments in the 
USA did discourage participation in crop insurance by about 20%. SA farmers’ 
expectations that they would receive State assistance in event of disasters may 
have contributed to the low participation rate in the SA crop insurance 





Whereas disaster payments discouraged crop insurance participation in the USA 
in the early eighties, subsidy incentives were changed under the 1999 
Agricultural Appropriations Act. Farmers with crop insurance may receive 
greater benefits from disaster payments which will encourage them to insure.  In 
addition to crop insurance indemnities, USA farmers can apply for disaster 
payment assistance (Dismukes, 1999). 
 
Increases in premium rates just prior to 1993 have been followed by substantial 
policy cancellation but the above estimates of a low price elasticity of demand 
indicate that other factors such as increased yields may have contributed to the 
lower participation rate. Goodwin (1993) indicated further that the price elasticity 
is relatively lower (higher) in counties where indemnity payments are high (low) 
relative to premiums. 
 
3.2 Systemic  risk 
 
Systemic risk in agriculture stems primarily from the impact of geographically 
extensive unfavourable weather events, such as drought or extreme 
temperatures, which induce significant correlation among individual farm-level 
yields. Insurers of random events such as automobile insurance need not keep 
high reserves as claims can be paid by premiums received even over relatively 
short periods. Insurers of non-random events such as drought need to keep large 
reserves which are costly. This lack of stochastic independence among individual 
yields defeats insurer efforts to pool crop loss risk across farms, causing crop 
insurers to bear substantially higher risk per unit of premium than other property 
liability and business insurers. Without adequate reinsurance or government 
subsidies, crop insurers pass the cost of bearing the additional risk onto farmers, 
rendering individual crop insurance extremely, if not prohibitively, expensive 
(Miranda & Glauber, 1997). 
 
Miranda and Glauber (1997) propose that systemic risk, and not asymmetric 
information, represents the primary cause of crop insurance market failure. They 
argue that if the asymmetric information problem is fundamentally intractable 
then private crop insurance markets are inherently not viable and government 
crop insurance programs cannot avoid suffering either high actuarial losses or 
low participation rates. If systemic risk is the primary cause of market failure they 
propose cost efficient remedies in the form of either area yield reinsurance or 
exchange traded area yield options. Their analysis indicates that, through the 
optimal use of these contracts, crop insurers could reduce their portfolio risk 
levels to those comparable with conventional insurers, thus substantially 





According to Miranda and Glauber (1997), an insurer’s portfolio of insurance 
liabilities embodies systemic risk to the extent that the riskiness of the portfolio is 
greater than if the liabilities were mutually independent. Systemic risk ratios 
indicate that United States crop insurers face portfolio risks 22 to 49 times larger 
than if indemnities were independent. The coefficient of variation (variance 
divided by mean) of total indemnities paid by the ten crop insurers ranged 
between 67% and 130% while the variations ranged between 5.3% and 5.6% for 
automobile and fire insurers to 14.9% for crop-hail insurers (Miranda & Glauber, 
1997). Crop insurers face portfolio risk approximately ten times larger than those 
faced by private insurers offering more conventional insurance.  
 
3.3  Impact of size on yield variability 
 
Schurle (1996) showed that smaller-acreage farms have greater yield variability 
than larger-acreage farms due to the aggregation effect. Smaller farmers may, 
however, have outside income sources which may reduce the total risk.  
 
4.  AREA YIELD CROP INSURANCE 
 
Area yield crop insurance has a short history in the USA. The US President’s 
proposed 1994 budget strongly endorsed GRP as a replacement for farm-based 
crop insurance. In response the US Congress did not eliminate farm-based crop 
insurance, but instead mandated that GRP be expanded to the extent practicable. 
Sweden implemented a similar programme at an earlier date (1961) while the 
Canadian province of Quebec introduced a programme in 1977 (Skees et al, 1997).  
 
4.1  An answer to asymmetric and systemic risk and high administration cost 
 
In his paper of 1949, Halcrow, cited by Miranda (1991), proposed an alternative to 
individual-yield crop insurance whereby indemnities and premiums would be 
based on the aggregate yield of a surrounding geographical area as opposed to an 
individual producer’s yield. Under an area-yield plan, the producer receives an 
indemnity equal to the difference, if positive, between the area yield and some 
predetermined critical yield level. Each participating producer receives the same 
indemnity, per insured acre, regardless of his or her own crop yield, and would 
therefore pay the same premium rate. 
 
Area yield crop insurance offers advantages over individual yield crop insurance 
by increasing the actuarial fairness of premiums. Adverse selection would be 
mitigated as information on area yields is readily available and reliable. Moral 




increase his or her indemnity by altering production practices. Administrative 
costs would also be substantially reduced as claims would not have to be 
adjusted individually and verification of individual production histories would 
not be required (Miranda, 1991 and Mahul, 1999). No fieldwork is required to 
adjust losses (Dismukes, 1999). These features are important for small-scale 
farmers where the cost of farm visits will be high per hectare of land and 
information on yields be lacking.  
 
Miranda (1991) decomposes individual yield variation into a systemic 
component, perfectly correlated with area yield, and a non-systemic component, 
uncorrelated with area yield. He defines a variable, ßi, that measures the 
sensitivity of the producer’s individual yield to the systemic factors that affect the 
area yield. The more highly correlated a producer’s yield is to area-yield, the 
greater the risk reduction from area-yield insurance. Producers with the highest 
ßi’s enjoy the greatest risk reduction under an area-yield plan (AYP), while 
producers with the highest yield variances obtain the best risk reduction under 
and individual yield plan (IYP). Area-yield crop insurance covers only systemic 
individual yield risk. There are areas where yield risks are not systemic for 
instance the problem of freeze in a fruit growing area. Non systemic risks such as 
hail are generally well provided by private insurance companies.  
 
4.2  Area yield crop insurance as a hedging instrument 
 
An AYP is not a true insurance programme since payments to producers are not 
based on their own specific yield losses. An AYP is more accurately described as 
a hedging instrument (Miranda, 1991 and Skees et al, 1997). More specifically, it is 
like a put option in which the critical yield (forecasted yield times elected 
coverage level) plays the role of the strike price.  
 
As with a put option on an index, an area yield policy has an associated basis risk 
(Skees et al, 1997). The basis risk is when a farmer experiences farm level yield 
losses when area shortfalls are insufficient to trigger an indemnity payment. The 
less than perfect correlation between the individual farm yield and the area-yield 
index reduces the effectiveness of the area-yield insurance instrument in 
managing individual farm income risk (Wang et al, 1998). 
 
4.3  The Group Risk Plan (GRP) 
 
Skees et al (1997) discuss the Group Risk Plan (GRP) in which the indemnity 
payments are based on the percentage shortfalls in actual area yields relative to a 
forecasted yield as opposed to Miranda’s AYP where indemnity payments are 




yield dates are used to develop forecasted yields and premiums. 
Most farm yields vary more than county yields due to the aggregation effect on 
individual data while farm yields may be greater than county yields. Farmers are 
thus allowed to scale the amount of protection they purchase by up to 150% of 
the forecasted yield times the expected price. This will help in setting a target 
indemnity payment that meets cash flow requirements. Scaling is important for 
providing more risk protection as farm yields are not perfectly correlated with 
county yields (Skees et al, 1997). 
 
Skees et al (1997) provides the following example to illustrate the workings of a 
GRP. For a given year a county (the Area) has a forecasted soybean yield of 40 
bushels per acre. The forecast is made about six months before farmers make 
their insurance purchase decision and plant their crops. A scaling of 150% with a 
forecasted yield of 40 bushels per acre and an established FCIC price of $6.00 
allows a farmer to purchase up to $360 of protection per acre. The farmer selects a 
90% coverage level. Thus the critical yield is 36 bushels per acre (90% x 40). The 
farmer will receive an indemnity if the actual county yield is below 36 bushels 
per acre. If the actual county yield were 27 bushels per acre or 25% below the 
trigger yield of 36 bushels per acre, the producer would receive an indemnity 
payment of $90 per acre ($360 x 25%). 
 
Prices used in indemnity payments are set at planting. In the case of MPCI an 
expected price is used. Group Risk Income Protection uses the harvest-time 
future’s market price (Dismukes, 1999). Both procedures keep the value of the 
insurance consistent with the expected value of the crop. 
 
4.4  The basis risk 
 
Basis risk is when farm level yield losses are experienced while area shortfalls are 
insufficient to trigger indemnity payments. It is important, in designing area 
yield contracts, to minimise this risk. Four elements of contract design are able to 
affect the basis risk: the area to be used for the yield index, the procedure for 
forecasting the central tendency in yields for the area, the indemnity payout rules 
and the insurance deductible and protection choices.  
 
4.5  Optimal coverage levels 
 
Should producers be free to select their coverage level under an AYP and how 
high should the critical yield be set? Under an IYP, the yield guarantee is 
normally set well below the producer’s normal yield and coverage levels in 
excess of 100% are not permitted. This is necessary to guard against moral 




coverage levels and high critical yields are feasible. Risks are reduced under 
optimal AYP’s (where coverage levels are optional) for all individuals as the 
critical yield increases.  
 
4.6  Considerations in designing GRP 
 
GRP coverage requires a significant county yield history to determine actuarial 
premium and coverage levels. Area-yield insurance is effective in reducing 
administrative costs and asymmetric information problems (the only paper work 
required from the insured is an acreage report shortly after the normal planting 
period). 
 
However, the assumption in GRP is that when county (provincial) yields are low, 
most farmers in that county will also have low yields. This is the situation in 
dryland cropping areas in South Africa where drought conditions are 
widespread. If this is not the case as in fruit growing regions an individual 
insurance is preferred. Wang et al (1998) conclude that at high levels of yield basis 
risk, an area yield index does not allow a farmer to manage yield risk efficiently 
and an individual farm yield index is a preferred design.   
 
According to Miranda (1991) producers tend to shun the options and futures 
market as measure of hedging price risk. AYP’s therefore may not get 
widespread acceptance. In order to get high rates of participation, AYP’s may 
have to be subsidised (Miranda, 1991).  
 
While systemic yield risk is reduced by the same proportion under an AYP, the 
total risk reduction varies among producers. In areas defined as homogenous 
regarding soil or climate, non-systemic yield risk can be attributed almost 
exclusively to producer specific factors such as choice of production practices. 
Reduction of the latter may promote a misallocation of resources by encouraging 
risky production. 
 
5.  REINSURANCE 
 
Common risks fall in a continuum between perfectly independent at one extreme 
and perfectly correlated at the other. Auto and life is near the perfectly 
independent side and prices and exchange rates are near the perfectly correlated 
side with crop yield in between but more towards the perfectly correlated side. 
Insurance markets provide protection to independent risk while option and 
future markets are developed to handle correlated risks.  
 




risk. The cost of holding reserves sufficient to cover huge losses like widespread 
drought renders private crop reinsurance prohibitively expensive. As an 
alternative to the current reinsurance programme, Miranda and Glauber (1997) 
propose the development of markets for area-yield reinsurance contracts. These 
contracts could be marketed on established options and future exchanges or, 
alternatively, sold by the government.   
 
5.1 Area-yield  reinsurance 
 
Area-yield reinsurance contracts would indemnify the owner based on shortfalls 
in regional yields, offering crop insurers protection against huge losses resulting 
from widespread natural disasters. The contract would be written by the 
government, for a specific region, crop and yield guarantee and settled on final 
regional crop yield estimates. Premiums would be set based on actuarial 
considerations. Miranda’s farm level model showed that the most dramatic risk 
reduction would be obtained if the contracts were offered at state level in the 
United States.  
 
Area-yield reinsurance could be provided by government at low cost given that 
historical yield levels for various crops and regions have been compiled for years. 
No additional information beyond what is currently being collected would be 
required to settle reinsurance claims. Area yields could not be manipulated by the 
insurer. Government area-yield reinsurance contracts could therefore 
significantly reduce potential moral hazard and adverse selection problems 
between the government and the insurer. Rate setting responsibilities for 
individual policies could be shifted to the insurance company, which would 
assume some underwriting gains and losses from individual crop insurance 
contracts at the margin. This would restore incentives for crop insurance 
companies to improve their actuarial performance by closely monitoring the 
adverse selection and moral hazard problems between the insurance company 
and the individual farmer.  
 
5.2 Area-yield  options 
 
Options and future markets offer a free-mark  alternative to government 
provision of area-yield reinsurance. Like area-yield reinsurance contracts, the 
writer of the option (like the writer of the reinsurance contract) would pay the 
bearer of the contract the value of the shortfall in regional yield. The contracts 
would be written by profit driven futures markets participants and the premium 
rates would be set by an open market process.  




Options and futures markets offer a viable alternative to government reinsurance 
precisely because such markets are designed for the allocation of highly 
correlated risk (Miranda & Glauber, 1997). 
 
Area-yield options contracts would be efficiently priced on a competitive market 
and would reflect the full spectrum of private information available on how 
various factors, like prevailing weather patterns, are affecting yield expectations. 
They would be available to anyone whose income varies with aggregate 
agricultural production while participation in government crop insurance 
programs has been limited to farmers. According to Miranda and Glauber (1997) 
the Chicago Board of Trade has launched trade in Iowa area-yield futures in 1995. 
They contend that if the private insurers succeed in reducing the cost of adverse 
selection and moral hazard that it may be possible for the federal government to 
withdraw entirely from the crop insurance market.  
 
6.  SMALL-SCALE FARMERS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
6.1  Crop statistics on small-scale farmers (ESKOM, 1999). 
 
There are approximately 2.1 million households (of a total of 8.6 million in the 
country) engaged in some form of small-scale farming. These farms are 
concentrated in three main areas:  
 
  Eastern and Western Cape  (31%) 
 KwaZulu-Natal  (27%) 
 Northern  Province  (24%). 
 
These small-scale farmers can be divided into three types: 
 
(a)  Emerging farmers who earn money by farming as well as other means and 
who are trying to become established full time farmers (7% or 140 000). 
 
(b)  Farmers who farm as a hobby or sideline, but make a living by other 
means (18% or 380 000) 
 
(c)  People who grow food and livestock to make ends meet - subsistence 
farmers (75% or 1540 000). 
 
Over 90% of these farmer grow some form of crop or vegetable or fruit. Maize is 
grown by 73% of farmers while substantial proportions grow various vegetables: 
beans (48% of farmers), pumpkin/hubbard squash/butternut (47 %), spinach 




(15%), beetroot (13%), sweet potatoes (10 %). The only fruit of significance was 
peaches (17%). All other crop types have an incidence below 10%. Due to climatic 
differences between provinces these crops are grown in different proportions in 
the provinces. 
 
Maize contributed 56% to crop income followed by spinach 10%, potatoes 6% and 
others 28%. Although two thirds of these small farmers own livestock, crops 
contribute more to income than livestock. 
 
6.2  Sentraoes crop insurance  
 
Sentraoes has a group insurance contract for hail with the Lesedi Corporation for 
60 small wheat farmers (Van Rooyen, 2000). Farms are, however, individually 
insured with the Corporation as the names of individual policy holders appear 
on the addendum of the contract. The small farmers are all insured for the same 
yield and all pay the same premium. Farms are visited only once to determine 
claims. No subsidy is received for this insurance. 
 
Area insurance for drought will be more cost effective than individual insurance, 
as at least two visits are required for drought insurance. A subsidy will still be 
needed to make this policy viable (Van Rooyen, 2000). He suggests that the cost 
of monitoring could be reduced by (a) using satellites, (b) taking samples from 
say 10 farmers in an area of say 100 farmers and (c) utilising a network of people 
on the ground for instance people familiar with the area and using bicycles. He 
further contends that insurance for vegetables will not be viable as risks vary 
dramatically between crops while the latter is grown in small patches.  Van 
Rooyen (2000) is of the opinion that individual drought insurance will not be 
viable. 
 
6.3  Fire insurance for small-scale cane farmers 
 
Grocane provides fire insurance to 230 small-scale cane farmers from the 2000 
season. No subsidy is received for this insurance and payments are based on the 
final cane price. The premium is only paid at the end of the season and based on 
tons crushed (Oliver, 2000). Although small-scale farms are individually insured 
they are treated as a group as they can not comply with certain requirements for 
insurance and because of their size. Grocane is reinsured through Lloyds of 
London. 
 
No drought insurance is available to small and large-scale commercial cane 









A crop insurance programme for small-scale farmers will probably be targeted at 
the 140 000 emergent farmers. Dryland maize will be an important crop in such a 
programme. Area insurance as discussed in this document is proposed where 
risks are systemic as in the case of dryland crop farming. Vegetable crops are also 
important in small-scale farming but the risks that affect the latter are not of a 
systemic nature as these crops are under irrigation. Consideration should be 
given to individual yield insurance in the latter case. According to van Rooyen 
(2000) individual yield insurance for vegetables may also not be viable as risks 
differ between vegetable crops while individual crops are grown in small 
patches. Maize and wheat are grown on a larger scale but even in this instance 
farms may be small, as most small-scale farms in KwaZulu-Natal are less than 
two ha. 
 
Innovative solutions should be considered to reduce high administration cost as 
these costs may make the programme not economically viable. Administration 
cost can be reduced through group schemes as for example the group scheme of 
Sentraoes. Livestock is important on most farms which provides liquidity and a 
stabilising influence on small-scale farming in the dryland crop areas. 
 
7.  ESTIMATED ANNUAL COST OF SMALL HOLDER CROP 
INSURANCE TO SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT 
 
In this section the annual cost of small holder crop insurance to the South African 
Government will be estimated based on estimated value of small holder 
production in South Africa and relative cost data for the USA.  
 
In 1998, USA growers paid about $900 million in crop insurance premiums for 
about $28 billion in guarantees on about 180 million acres of crops. During 1995-
98 the USDA’s Risk Management Agency has spent about $1.2 billion per year on 
premium subsidies, administration and operating subsidies, and net-
underwriting losses. The cost of a GRP will be lower than of individual yield 
insurance but on the other hand targeting the programme at small farmers in 
South Africa will substantially increase the cost. 
 
The contribution of small holder production to gross farm income is estimated by 
experts who have worked in this field at 5% to 6% (Vink, 2000 and Meyer, 2000) 




most researchers working in this field support this figure. 
Gross income of field crops and horticulture for the SA agricultural sector 
(1998/99) = R26020.4 million (NDA, 2000: 84). 
 
  Estimated % contribution of small farmers to total  
 production  5.5%   
  Gross income (crops and horticulture) of small holders   R1431.1 million 
  Estimated total insurance liability of small holder  
 production  R1431.1  million 
  Estimated percentage of crops insured   66% 
  Annual cost to the South African Government  
  (assume 66% insured)   R40.5 million 
  Estimated premiums paid by small growers  
  (assume 66% insured)  R30.4 million 
 
The subsidy cost to the South African treasury is estimated at R40.5 million given 
that 66% of crops and horticultural products of small holders are insured. The 
information requirements of an in insurance programme for vegetable crops will 
be high if individual farms are insured.  
 
8. CONCLUDING  COMMENTS 
 
Droughts are a common phenomenon in Southern Africa. It is important to be 
pro-active rather than reactive and the SA government’s concern regarding risk 
management strategies is a wise decision.  This risk protection can facilitate 
access to operating loans by offering some financial security to a lender. In the 
USA, farmers have been encouraged to insure their crops in order to mitigate the 
impacts of drought. The US crop insurance programme has, however, been 
expensive to the government as the contribution of the US government to the 
programme exceeds premiums paid by growers.   
 
The high cost of the USA programme has been attributed to asymmetric 
information (adverse selection and moral hazard) and systemic risk. The 
administration cost for small growers of a crop insurance programme will be 
significantly more than for large growers as farms need to be visited to verify 
claims. In recent years several journal papers have shown the advantages of area 
insurance as a method to overcome these problems. The USA Department of 
Agriculture has adopted an area insurance plan (called Group Risk Plan) in 1994. 
Indemnity payments are made when the area yield falls below a critical level and 
there is no need to visit farms to access claims. In the SA situation the cost of such 
a programme will be substantially less for small growers than an individual 




Insurance schemes are most effective in reducing producer risk when contracts 
are written by the private sector while g o v e r n m e n t  s u b s i d i s e s  p a r t  o f  t h e  
underwriting losses and administration costs. The private sector would also 
perform the initial farm level examinations, conduct claim assessments and bear a 
share of the risk. Private sector reinsurers would help form the pricing strategy 
and also bear a share of the risk. It is essential that schemes be structured in a 
way which provides incentive to farmers to reduce risk exposure by adopting 
risk-reducing practices or investing in risk-reducing improvements. 
 
Along with insurance, risk management strategies should be considered such as 
low risk technologies (McGregor & Hudson, 1999). Incorporation of a livestock 
factor in high-risk crop areas may provide the farmer with better liquidity (Jarvie 
and Nieuwoudt, 1989). McGregor & Hudson (1999) favoured that only input cost 
should be insured and not unrealised profit. Input cost insurance has often been 
proposed but under an insurance programme a farmer can determine what 
percentage of total income is cost and insure his crop at that level. 
 
9.  LESSONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA 
 
The following lessons are drawn from this study. 
 
1.  Subsidised crop insurance for individual small-scale vegetable growers 
under irrigation will be more appropriate than area insurance. The reason 
is that risk faced by these growers is not of a systemic nature (correlation 
between yields for different farmers is low if drought is eliminated) and 
different farmers may experience different risks. It may, however, not be 
economically viable to insure vegetable crops of small holders under 
irrigation as risks for individual vegetable crops differ while individual 
crops are grown in small patches.  If individual areas under a crop are 
larger then private insurers may be interested to insure against this type of 
risk as the risk associated with vegetables is not expected to affect whole 
regions and the cost of holding large reserves is thus not a problem. 
I n d i v i d u a l  c r o p  i n s u r a n c e  m a y  t h e n  b e  v i a b l e  a s  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  f i r e  
insurance (sugar cane) and hail insurance. Small farmers are individually 
insured for hail through a group insurance contract between Sentraoes and 
the Lesedi Corporation. Innovative group insurance contracts could reduce 
the administration costs. 
 
A variety of vegetables are grown by small-scale farmers and due to 
climatic differences in the provinces, different crops dominate in the 
different provinces. Main contributors to crop income are spinach and 




insurance is, however, high because of the high administration cost (cost of 
farm visits, verification of damages, not availability of information etc.) in 
addition to problems such as adverse selection and moral hazard.  
 
2.  An area insurance plan (farmers are insured as a group) is proposed for 
dryland field crops such as maize because risk is systemic (drought 
related). In this Report the Group Risk Plan (GRP) whereby a farmer takes 
out insurance on a crop loss of the area is shown to be more cost effective 
especially for small-scale farmers. The GRP has lower administration cost 
as individual farm yields are not required, and verification of individual 
farm losses is not needed. Further adverse selection and moral hazard are 
not issues. GRP is appropriate where unfavourable weather induces high 
correlations among individual farm yields (systemic risk is high).  
 
3.  The value of field crops and horticultural products of small holders is 
estimated at R1431 million. Assuming 66% is insured, then the government 
contribution is estimated at R 40 million and the premium cost to growers 
at R30 million. The cost to the Government is estimated as 33% more than 
the premium cost to growers. These cost estimates are seen as conservative 
due to the small farm sizes and the non-availability of sufficient data series 
to capture risks.  
 
4.  A problem with crop insurance is that a large part of the cost to 
government goes to administration of the scheme and thus does not reach 
the target group (farmers). Due to the high cost of crop insurance to the 
government other strategies of risk management for small growers should 
be considered such an Income Equalisation Deposit (IED) scheme.  
 
5.  It is recommended that an IED for small growers should receive serious 
consideration with the government making a contribution as for example 
in Canada. Instead of the government paying R133 for every R100 that a 
grower pays for crop insurance the government could make a matching 
contribution to small growers, with the contribution being gradually 
phased out when the grower’s turnover say reach R50 000. If an IED for 
large-scale commercial farms is accepted then this will provide a logical 
link between the drought assistance provided to small and large-scale 
farming. An IED for small growers can include all enterprises namely 
crops, horticultural crops and livestock. It will thus be of a more inclusive 
strategy than crop insurance. In addition an IED does not have the 
problems that are inherent in crop insurance (asymmetric information etc). 
A main issue in South Africa is the high cost of delivery of crop insurance 






COBLE, K.H., KNIGHT, T.O., POPE, R.D., & WILLIAMS, J.R. (1997). An 
expected-indemnity approach to the measurement of moral hazard in crop 
insurance. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 79(1):216-226. 
 
DISMUKES, R. (1999). Recent developments in crop yield and revenue insurance. 
Agricultural Outlook, 261. 
 
DISMUKES, R. (2000). Crop and revenue insurance. Agricultural Outlook, 269. 
 
ESKOM. (1999).  Consumers in South Africa. Eskom, Johannesburg. 
 
GOODWIN, B.K. (1993). An empirical analysis of the demand for multiple peril 
crop insurance. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 75(May):425-434. 
 
HARWOOD, J., HEIFNER, R., PERRY, J., SOMWARU, A. & COBLE, K. (1999). 
Farmers sharpen tools to confront business risk. Agricultural Outlook, 259:12-16. 
 
JARVIE, E.M. & NIEUWOUDT, W.L. (1988). Factors influencing crop insurance 
participation in maize farming. Agrekon, 28(2):11-16. 
 
KRUGER, J. (2000). Personal comment. NDA Tel 012-3196137. 
 
MAHUL, O. (1999). Optimum Area Yield Crop Insuance. American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, 81(1):75-82. 
 
MCGREGOR, A. & HUDSON, C.J. (1999). Drought insurance for the small-farmer. 
Hammond and Graaffs, Cape Town. (Proposal submitted to NDA). 
 
MEYER, N. (2000). Personal comment. DBSA. Tel-011 3133038.  
 
MIRANDA, M.J. (1991). Area yield crop insurance reconsidered. American Journal 
of Agricultural Economics, 73(2):233-242. 
 
MIRANDA, M.J. & GLAUBER, J.W. (1997). Systemic risk, reinsurance, and the 
failure of crop insurance markets. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 79 
(February):206-215. 
 
NDA. (2000). Abstract of agricultural statistics. Directorate Communications. 
Pretoria. 




NIEUWOUDT, W.L. & BULLOCK, J.B. (1986). The demand for crop insurance 
Proceedings of Nineteenth International Conference of Agricultural Economists, 
Malaga, Spain. Published in Agriculture in a Turbulent World Economy ( Edit A 
Maunder), Gower. 
 
NIEUWOUDT, W.L., JOHNSON, S.R., WOMACK A.W. & BULLOCK, J.B. (1985). 
The demand for crop insurance. Agricultural Economic Report 1985-16. Department 
of Agricultural Economics, University Missouri-Columbia, Missouri 65211, USA.  
 
NIEUWOUDT, W.L. (1984). The viability of an agricultural crop insurance 
programme - a policy issue. Agrekon, 23(2):9-13. 
 
OLIVER, C. (2000). Personal comment. General Manager Grocane. Tel 031-
3045251/2/3. 
 
RAY, P.K. (1981). Agricultural insuance-theory and practice and application to 
developing countries. Oxford: Pergamon Press. 
 
SCHURLE, B. (1996). The impact of size on yield variability and crop insurance 
premiums. Review of Agricultural Economics, 18(3):415-422. 
 
SKEES, J.R., BLACK, J.R. & BARNETT, B.J. (1997). Designing and rating an area 
yield crop insurance contract. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 
79(2):420-438. 
 
SMITH, V.H. & BAQUET, A.E. (1996). The demand for multiple peril crop 
insurance: evidence from Montana Wheat Farms. American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, 78(1):189-201. 
 
TASK TEAM ON DROUGHT AND OTHER AGRICULTURAL DISASTER (1997). 
Managing risk in agriculture. Chapter 3. 
 
VAN ROOYEN, I. (2000). Personal comment. Director Sentraoes. Ficksburg Tel 082 
5695 996. 
 
VINK, N. (2000). Personal comment. Department of Agricultural Economics. 
University of Stellenbosch.  
 
WANG, H.H., HANSON, S.D., MYERS, R.J. & BLACK, J.R. (1998). The effects of 
crop insurance yield design on farmer participation and welfare. American Journal 
of Agricultural Economics, 80(4):806-820. 